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Johnson v. Home State Bank: Seven Plus
Thirteen Can Equal Twenty
I.

INTRODUCTION-

In Johnson v. Home State Bank (In re Johnson),' the United States
Supreme Court approved -the property-saving strategy of filing under
Chapter 72 of the Bankruptcy Code, immediately followed by a filing
under Chapter 13," the so-called "Chapter 20." The Court held that a
mortgage lien that survived the discharge of the debtor's personal obligations in Chapter 7 is a "claim" for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5),4 and

thus may be included by the debtor in a subsequent Chapter 13 plan.5
Chapter 20 procedures typically follow a similar pattern. A debtor defaults on loan payments, including a home mortgage. The debtor does not
possess sufficient income to pay his total debt owing under a Chapter 13
restructuring and cannot eliminate the home mortgage and prevent foreclosure under Chapter 7.
By first filing under Chapter 7, the debtor eliminates all personal liabilities, including personal liability on the home mortgage. With a decreased
total debt burden, the debtor files under Chapter 13; forcing the bank to
de-accelerate the loan, thereby allowing the debtor to cure any arrearages
and keep the house.
IL

PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE

Johnson executed promissory notes totalling approximately
the Home State Bank (the "bank"). As security, Johnson
mortgage on his farm property. Johnson defaulted, and the
foreclosure proceedings in state court. Johnson then filed a
1.

$470,000 to
executed a
bank began
petition for

111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991).

2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (1979 & Supp. 1991). A successful filing under Chapter 7 discharges all personal liability of the debtor, but not liens on the property. The effect is to
turn recourse-debt into nonrecourse-debt. Id.
3. Id. §§ 1301-30. Chapter 13 provides for an adjustment of debt for wage earners (salary, commissions, etc). The debtor formulates and files a plan that provides extra time to
pay off creditors, Id.
4. 111 S. Ct. at 2154.
5. Id. at 2152.
6. Id.
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liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy
court discharged Johnson's personal liability on the note, then lifted the
automatic stay. The bank proceeded to foreclose, and the state granted
the bank an in rem judgment of approximately $200,000. After the judgment, but before the foreclosure sale, Johnson filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 13, listing the bank's mortgage as a "claim" against
7
his estate.
The bankruptcy court confirmed the Chapter 13 plan. The bank appealed, and the district court reversed, holding that the Bankruptcy Code
does not allow a debtor to include in a Chapter 13 plan a mortgage upon
which personal liability was discharged in Chapter 7.6 The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the Bank no longer had a
"claim" against the debtor which could be rescheduled under Chapter
13.1 Since two other Circuit Courts of Appeals concluded that a mortgage
lien could be included in a Chapter 13 plan subsequent to a Chapter 7
discharge,10 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict"
and reversed."'
III.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF "CHAPTER 20"

Before the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson, the courts were split
on the question of whether a debtor whose personal liability on a mortgage had been discharged in Chapter 7 could then file a Chapter 13 and
force his mortgagee to accept the cure of any outstanding defaults,
13
thereby preventing foreclosure.
The traditional authority had its genesis in In re Cowen,"' in which the
debtors filed a petition under Chapter 7,15 The trustee disclaimed any
interest in their real estate and attempted to get the debtors to convert to
Chapter 13. A junior mortgagee, listed as a party secured by the debtor's
home in the Chapter 7 suit, began foreclosure proceedings in state court.
The state court entered a default judgment and scheduled a sheriff's sale
of the debtor's residence. Before the sale, and with the Chapter 7 suit still
7.
8.
9.
10.
1987).
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
In re Johnson, 96 B.R. 326, 328-30 (Bankr. D. Kan 1989).
In re Johnson, 904 F.2d 563, 565-66 (10th Cir. 1990).
In re Saylors, 869 F.2d 1434 (11th Cir. 1989); In re Metz, 820 F.2d 1495 (9th Cir.
111 S. Ct. at 781.
In re Johnson, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 2153 (1991).
Id.
29 B.R. 888 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
Id. at 889.
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pending, the debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition, to which the creditor objected. A Chapter 7 discharge was granted two months later."
The court held that the Chapter 13 petition was a nullity since the
Chapter 7 suit was pending when the debtors filed the Chapter 13 petition. 7 The court went on to say "in what must be considered dicta" Is
that
[t]he granting of a [Chapter 7] discharge relieves a debtor from personal
liability on the discharged debt. Thus, although a lien may survive,. . . a
discharged debt which was not properly reaffirmed is not cognizable as
"debt" in a subsequent proceeding without either a novation of the prior
obligation or the creation of an entirely new debt. Thus, the proposal "to
cure" a previously discharged debt is itself an impossibility, despite...
remedies accorded a lienholder under state law by virtue of a lien based
on such discharged debt.1'
The court in In re Fryer" quoted and applied this reasoning without
further explanation.2 1 The debtor apparently still had a Chapter 7 suit
pending, 22 and the court chose not to dispose of the case as it had in
Cowen" (by declaring the Chapter 13 petition a "nullity")."4
. The court extended this reasoning in In re Brown," when the question
presented was "whether a chapter 13 case filed after a discharge in a
chapter 7 case may be utilized to compel a mortgagee to accept the cure
of an arrearage owed to it on the defaulted mortgage."' Answering in the
negative, the court reasoned as follows: (1) the chapter 13 plan could only
deal with creditors; (2) a creditor is an entity with a claim against the
debtor; (3) claim is defined in the Bankruptcy Code' 7 as "a right to payment, or a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance"; and,
therefore, (4) the mortgagee was not a creditor since its contractual right
to payment disappeared with the discharge, and the mortgagor's equitable right to redemption did not create any status between the parties as
to which there could be a breach of performance.' The court buttressed
its unduly technical reasoning with a finding that the debtor's conduct
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 892.
Id. at 894-95.
In re Hagberg, 92 B.R. 809, 812 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1988).
29 B.R. at 895.
47 B.R. 180 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
Id. at 182.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 26.
47 B.R. at 180.
52 B.R. 6 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
Id. at 6.
11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1979), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) Supp. 1991).
52 B.R. at 7.
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also called for sustaining the objection to confirmation of the debtor's
29

plan.

In re Binford30 adopted the Brown reasoning, including a parenthetical
notation that redemption and reaffirmation are the exclusive methods for
Chapter 7 bankrupts to keep their property. 1 The court explained that
the debtor was trying to "do indirectly that which he cannot do directly,
[that is] file a Chapter 13 and compel reaffirmation of a debt .... 3
In re Lewis"3 was the first case to break with this line of reasoning. '
The debtors received their Chapter 7 discharge some years before filing
under Chapter 13.8 Judge Goldhaber believed the new definition of claim
in the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 was dispositive.3 6 He cited the legislative
history, which revealed that Congress believed it was giving the word
"claim" its
broadest possible definition, and by use of the term throughout the title
11, especially in subchapter I of chapter 5, the bill contemplates that all
legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, -will
be able' to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest
possible relief in the bankruptcy court."
The court stated that all legal obligations constitute claims, and that
38
any equitable obligation giving rise to a right of payment is also a claim.
The court then held that "a claim may include a creditor's encumbrance
against property of the estate although there is no in personam liability
against the debtor. This would, of course, include the situation presented
in the instant case." 3' 9 The lienholder 'also argued that it was not a creditor and was thus not barred from foreclosing by the automatic stay.' 0 The
court disagreed, refusing to find bad faith per se in the filing of a Chapter
13 suit within two years of a Chapter 7 discharge.' 1
29. Id.
30. 53 B.R. 307 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985). See also In re McKinstry, 56 B.R. 191 (Bankr.
D. Vt. 1986), which adopts and explains the Binford court's reasoning.

31. 53 B.R. at 309. See also 52 B.R. at 7.
32. 53 B.R. at 309. "The rights to modify an. existing contract pursuant to Section
1322(b)(2) and (5) do not negate the requirements of Section 524(c) mandating that reaffirmation agreements may only be enforceable by agreement of the parties .
Id.
33. 63 B.R. 90 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986).
34. In re Hagberg, 92 B.R. 809, 814 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1988).
35. 63 B.R. at 91.
36. Id. at 92-93.
37. Id. at 92 (quoting 'HR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6266).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.at 92-93,
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In the same year, another bankruptcy court dissented from what it
called the "majority view."' 42 In In re Lagasse, the court stated that a
Chapter 7 discharge converts a recourse debt into a nonrecourse obligation and that nonrecourse debt could be rescheduled under Chapter 13.48
"The clear language of [11 U.S.C. ]§§ 102(2) and (4), and [§] 1322(b)(5)
does not forbid it, and the legislative history of [§] 102(2) supports it."
The court then quoted from the legislative history as follows:
Paragraph [101](2) specifies that "claim against the debtor" includes
claim against property of the debtor. This paragraph is intended to cover
nonrecourse loan agreements where the creditor's only rights are against
property of the debtor, and not against the debtor personally: Thus, such
an agreement would give rise to a claim that would be treated as a claim
against the debtor personally, for the purposes of bankruptcy code.""
In In re Metz,"4 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals became the first
circuit court to address the question. The court in Metz reviewed both
lines of authority and held the Lagasse/Lewis reasoning more persuasive,
adding "although a chapter 13 plan may, as a matter of law, cure arrearages on a mortgage debt discharged by chapter 7, the plan may nevertheless violate the purpose and spirit of chapter 13 and thus not be submitted in good faith.' 4 7 The court then applied the "totality of the
circumstances" test to determine the good faith of the debtors."
Due to improved circumstances ("precisely what the bankruptcy judge
should examine to see if successive filings are proper"49), the debtor pro-

posed to pay the arrears on his mortgage over time and keep his regular
-payments current.8 0 Holding the bankruptcy court's finding of good faith
was not clearly erroneous, the court rejected the creditor's contentions. 1
The tide had clearly turned in favor of allowing the "Chapter 20" strategy, and the courts began to focus their attention on the question of good
2

faith.5
42. In re Lagrasse, 66 B.R. 41, 43 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986). See also In re Klapp, 80 B.R.
540 (Bankr. W.D. Oklahoma 1987), comparing Lagasse and Lewis to the earlier authority
and adopting them as the "clearly the better view." Id. at 542.
43. 66 B.R. at 43.
44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 315, reprinted at 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6272).
46. 820 F.2d 1495 (9th Cir. 1987).
47. Id. at 1498.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1499.
52. See, e.g., In re Hagberg, 92 B.R. 809 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1988) (Chapter 13 petition
dismissed for bad faith when debtor had obtained a Chapter 7 discharge and filed two previ-
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In 1989 the Eleventh Circuit settled the question in In re Saylors. s
This case followed the typical pattern. Saylors and his wife filed under
Chapter 7, listing a debt to Jim Walter Homes, and obtained a discharge.
Jim Walter moved for relief from the automatic stay, and the court
.granted the motion. The Saylors then filed a Chapter 13 petition, seeking
relief from the arrearage on the mortgage debt. The Chapter 7 trustee
subsequently filed his final report and abandoned all interest in the
property."
Over the objection of Jim Walter Homes, the bankruptcy court confirmed the Saylors' plan to pay a portion of the arrearage plus a full regular monthly payment. Jim Walter appealed, and the district court reversed. The Saylors then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals."
Relying on In re Metz,5" the court held that, at least in Alabama (where
the Saylors' home was located), a home mortgage debt is transformed into
a nonrecourse obligation upon discharge in Chapter 7, since in Alabama
the home owner still retains two property rights, the equitable and statutory rights of redemption."7 The court held that, although the creditor's
rights were modified by the debtor's discharge, the debtor's property
rights were unchanged." Taking into account the intent of Congress to
create an "equitable and feasible way for the honest and conscientious
debtor to pay off his debts," the court stated that deserving debtors
should not be absolutely prohibited from using this procedure." The good
faith filing requirement is sufficient to prevent improper use of Chapter
13.60
The district court asserted two arguments thought demonstrative of the
bad faith of the debtors as a matter of law." First, the debtor filed for
ous Chapter 13 petitions); In re Ligon, 97 B.R. 398 (Bankr. N.D. Illinois 1989) ("conclusion
that Bankruptcy Code allows the mortgage to be reinstated ... is merely the starting point
for analysis"); In re Smith, 94 B.R. 216 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1988) (Chapter 20 allowed generally, but on specific facts was found "inequitable" due to continuous defaults).
53. 869 F.2d 1434 (11th Cir. 1989).
54. Id. at 1435.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1436. See supra text accompanying note 55.
57. 869 F.2d at 1436. Equitable redemption allows the debtor to pay off a debt before
foreclosure and redeem the property. The statutory right gives the debtor the right to redeem his property for some specified time after foreclosure. In Alabama this right termi-

nates in one year.

ALA. CODE

58.
59.

869 F.2d at 1436.
Id.

60.

Id.

61.

Id. at 1436-37.

§ 6-5-230 (1975).
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Chapter 13 protection before the Chapter 7 trustee filed his final report.62
Second, the debtor filed one day before the automatic stay was lifted, and
this was a final adjudication of Jim Walters right to foreclose."
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Code sets forth
no rule against filing a Chapter 13 petition between discharge and the
filing of the final report.4 Also, the court summarily dismissed the res
judicata argument as without merit."
After Saylors, the Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 strategy became so common that one court stated that malpractice would probably exist should
an attorney not utilize Chapter 20 when appropriate." The Ninth and
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals were the only appellate courts to directly address the Chapter 20 question until the Tenth Circuit decided
67
Johnson,
V.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Supreme Court set the stage with its reasoning in Pennsylvania
Departmentof Public Welfare v. Davenport." The debtors in Davenport
pleaded guilty to welfare fraud, and a Pennsylvania court ordered them
to make restitution payments. The debtors filed a Chapter 13 petition
listing the restitution payments to the county as an unsecured debt. The
bankruptcy court confirmed the debtors' plan and labeled the restitution
obligation a dischargeable debt under Chapter 13. The district court reversed, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Kelly v. Robinson,"
and noting federalism concerns.70 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, "concluding that 'the plain language of the chapter' demonstrated
that restitution orders are debts within the meaning of the Code and
hence dischargeable in proceedings under Chapter 13.' 71
62. Id. at 1436.
63. Id. at 1437-38.
64. Id. at 1437.
65. Id. at 1438. "The . . .order . . . merely lifted the automatic stay in the chapter 7
case. In no way did the order purport to be a permanent adjudication of Jim Walter's right
to foreclose." Id.
66. In re Jones 105 B.R. 1007, 1012 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989).
67. In re Johnson, 904 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying
text and text accompanying infra notes 83-125.
68. 110 S. Ct. 2126 (1990). See infra text accompanying notes 109-10.
69. 479 U.S. 36 (1986). The Court holding that restitution obligations imposed as conditions of probation in state criminal action are non-dischargeable in proceedings under Chapter 7, but declined to reach the question of whether restitution obligations are "debts"
under the Code. Id. at 50.
- 70.
110 S. Ct. at 2130 (citing Davenport v. Pennsylvania, 89 B.R. 428 (Bank. E.D. Pa.
1988)).
71. Id. (quoting In re Johnson-Allen, 871 F.2d 421,,428 (3rd Cir. 1989)).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

1298

[Vol. 43

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 2 and first determined that the
terms "debt" and "claim" were co-extensive.7 Second, the definition of
"claim" in 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) includes a "right to payment". 7' Third,
'Congress had a "broad rather than restrictive" view of "claims" under the
Bankruptcy Code. 7 5 And finally, an obligation enforceable through criminal rather than civil mechanisms is still a "right of payment. ' '7 ' Restitution orders, therefore,
were within the scope of claims included in a Chap77
ter 13 plan.

Justices Blackmun and O'Conner dissented,"7 and Congress quickly
amended the Bankruptcy Code to "overrul[e] the Supreme Court's recent
decision . . .", with the Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990.80 The
legislative history makes it clear Congress was dissatisfied with criminals
using the Bankruptcy Code to avoid payment of restitution, but it does
not indicate dissatisfaction with the court's interpretation of claim as
"broad rather than restrictive."61

VI.

THE DECISION IN

Johnson

In In re Johnson, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Tenth
Circuit's holding that since the debtor's personal liability was discharged
in Chapter 7, the Bank no longer had a "claim" against Johnson subject
to rescheduling under Chapter 13.82 Focusing on the meaning of the word
claim as it is used in Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code," the Court
held that a mortgage lien in this situation is a claim subject to
rescheduling.8"
72.

493 U.S. 808 (1989).

73.

110 S. Ct. at 2130.

74.

Id.

75.

Id.

76. Id. at 2131. "Indeed, the right created by [a restitution order] granted as a condition
of probation is in some sense greater . . . because it is secured by the debtor's freedom
rather than his property." Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2134 (Blackmun, O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
79. S. Rep. No. 434, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. at 8 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4065, 4071.
80. Pub. L. No. 101-581, 104 Stat. 2856 (1990).
81. S. Rep. No. 434, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. at 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4065.
82. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2152-53.
83. Id. at 2153. A debtor who meets the eligibility requirements under § 109(e) (basically
an individual with regular income, whose debts do not exceed certain limits) may submit a
plan that "modifliesl the rights of holders of secured claims ... or ... unsecured claims,"
and that "provide[s] for the payment of all or any part of any [allowed] claim." 11 U.S.C. §
1322(b)(2), (6) (1984).
84. 111 S. Ct. at 2152-53.
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The Court first described the nature of mortgage interests that survive
discharge under Chapter 7.85 A creditor may proceed both in personam
and in rem to satisfy his debt, unless the debtor and creditor agree otherwise.86 Chapter 7 will protect the debtor against the in personam action,
but not the proceeding in rem. 7 This result is mandated by the Bankruptcy Code.68 The Code also mandates that a creditor's right to foreclose
survives bankruptcy."1
The Court then addressed the question of whether a surviving mortgage interest is a claim subject to Chapter 13 rescheduling as "a straightforward issue of statutory construction."' 0 Claim is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as either
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured: or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an
equitable remedy is reduced to judgment,'fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured."
Relying on its holding in Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare
v. Davenport," that Congress intended to adopt "the broadest available
definition of 'claim,'" the Court had "no trouble concluding that a mortgage interest that survives the discharge of a debtor's personal liability is
a claim within the terms of §101(5)." ' 1 The Court offered two rationales.
First, even though the Chapter 7 discharge releases the debtor from personal liability, the bank still has a "right to payment"'" out of the foreclosure sale proceeds."5 Second, the bank has a "right to an equitable remedy"' since it can foreclose on the debtor's property after the automatic
85. Id. at 2153.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1979 & Supp. 1991)
A discharge in-a case under this title (1) voids any judgement at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141,
1228, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived.
Id.
89. Id. § 522(c)(2), codifying Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1886).
90. 111 S.Ct. at 2153.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (Supp. 1991).
92. 110 S.Ct. 2126.
93. 111 S.Ct. at 2154.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (Supp. 1991). See supra text accompanying note 35,
95. 111 S. Ct. at 2154.
96. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(B) (Supp. 1991). See supra text accompanying note 35,
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stay is lifted.9 7 Regardless, the bank retains an "enforceable obligation"
against the debtor.98
A Chapter 7 discharge, therefore, only extinguishes one of two ways to
enforce a claim, not the claim itself." The in personam enforcement
method is frustrated, but the in rem enforcement method survives."'
The'Court stated that this interpretation was consistent with other
parts of the Code.10 ' Section 502(b)(1) instructs a bankruptcy court to
allow claims against either the debtor or his property.'"0 Also, as a rule of
construction, section 102(2) defines "claim against the debtor" to include
a "claim against the property of the debtor."' 3 The Court interpreted
this language to mean that a creditor (the Bank) with a claim against the
0
debtor's property has a "claim against the debtor" under the Code.' '
The Court then turned to the prior Bankruptcy Act for support. 00 The
pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act had no single definition of claim, but for purposes of Chapter X corporate reorganizations, it did define claim to include claims against both the debtor and the debtor's property.'" Congress, when defining claim for the new 1978 Bankruptcy Act, intended an
even broader term.1 7 The Court assumed Congress was aware of the existing interpretation under Chapter X of the old Act and inferred that
Congress intended an obligation enforceable against the debtor only in
rem be a claim under the new Code.' ° s
Next, the Court examined the legislative history surrounding the passage of section 102(2) of the Code. 09 Based on the House and Senate
Reports,"0 the Court said "this rule of construction contemplates, interalia, 'nonrecourse loan agreements where the creditor's only rights are

97.

111 S. Ct. at 2154.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. The court states that if Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886) (see supra note 105
and accompanying text) had not been codified, a Chapter 7 discharge would eliminate the

creditor's in rem rights as well.
101. 111 S. Ct. at 2154.
102. Id. at 2154-55.
103. Id. at 2155.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 506(1) (1976), repealed by 1978 Bankruptcy Act (codified
as Title 11 of the U.S.C.).
107. 111 S. Ct. at 2155 (citing HR. REP. No. 95-595 at 309).
108. Id.
109. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 45.
110. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6266. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 21-22 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5807-5808.
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against property of the debtor, and not against the debtor personally.' ""
The Court held a nonrecourse loan and a mortgage that passes through
Chapter 7 to have the "same properties."'"1 2 Though admitting the creditor never bargained for a nonrecourse loan, the Court decided it made no
difference, as Congress did not limit section 102(2) to nonrecourse
debts. '"8 The Court held the intent of Congress to be that "§ 102(2) extend[s] to all interests having the relevant attributes of nonrecourse obligations regardless of how these interests come into existence. 1114
The Bank (creditor) argued even if an action in rem is ordinarily an
allowable Chapter 13 claim, allowing the claim to be rescheduled when it
is merely the remainder of a personal liability discharged in Chapter 7 is
beyond what Congress intended to allow. 11 6 The Court rejected this argument, listing several types of serial filings that Congress had expressly
forbidden."' The "evident care" Congress used in fashioning these restrictions, and the absence of any similar restrictions on the serial filing
under Chapter 13 after a Chapter 7 discharge, led the Court to conclude
that Congress did not foreclose this remedy.117
The Court also stated that the Bank's position failed to consider the
safeguards the Code provided for Chapter 13 creditors.11 s First, the Code
requires a plan be proposed in good faith.11 ' Second, the plan must give
unsecured creditors approximately the same recovery as they would have
gotten under Chapter 7.12 Next, the Court noted that secured creditors
must "either have 'accepted the plan,' obtained the property securing
their claims, or 'retained[ed] the[irj lien[sl' where the 'value . . . of property to be distributed under the plan . . . is not less than the allowed

amount of such claim[s].' "12MAs a final safeguard, Congress
that the debtor fully comply with and be able to make all
under a Chapter 13 plan.12 2 The Court finally observed that
ruptcy courts retained broad equitable power to "'carry out
111.

mandated
payments
the bankthe provi-

111 S. Ct. at 2155.

112. Id.
113.

Id.

114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 2155-56.
116. Id. at 2156. Examples listed are: "11 U.S.C. § 109(g) (no filings within 180 days of
dismissal); § 727(a)(8) (no Chapter 7 filing within six years of a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11
filing); § 727(a)(9) (limitation on Chapter 7 filing within six years of Chapter 12 or Chapter
13 filing)." Id.
117. 111 S. Ct. at 2156.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1986)).
120. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1979).
121. 111 S. Ct. at 2156 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1979)).
122. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (1979)).
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sions of the [C)ode.' ""s Given the protection provided to creditors and
the broad interpretation of claim intended by Congress, the Court expressed doubt that "Congress intended the bankruptcy courts to use the
124
Code's definition of 'claim' to police the Chapter 13 process for abuse.
The Bank renewed its claim that the debtor had not filed the plan in
good faith and that the plan was not feasible, but as neither the district
court nor the court of appeals addressed these issues, the Court left them
for consideration on remand."' 5

VII. ANALYSIS
With In re Johnson, the "uncertainty in the law is removed completely."12 6 The Court is firmly within the LagrasselMetz line of authority, which construes claim in the Bankruptcy Code very broadly.127 The
courts that had refused to allow the Chapter 20 strategy "seem to ignore
or gloss over the existence of 11 U.S.C. section 102(2) and the language of
11 U.S.C. section 101(4). '121
The major arguments raised by the lower courts against allowing
"Chapter 20" filings have been rebutted."' The Cowen reasoning,""0 that
there is no "debt" so cure of it is impossible,'"' was not specifically dealt
with in Johnson. But in Davenport the Court said Congress intended
debt and claim to mean the same thing under the Code.1 ' Johnson and
Davenport make the supposed "impossibility" quite possible.
The decision in Brown that the mortgagee's "right to payment pursuant to a contractual arrangement" 1 3 disappeared upon discharge, and
therefore there was no section 101(4) right to payment is dealt with directly and dismissed."' The Court states that the creditor has a right to
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1979 & Supp. 1991)).
Id.
Id.
In re Hornlein, 130 B.R. 600, 602 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).

127.

See supra text accompanying notes 51-80.

128. In re Ligon, 97 B.R. 398, 403 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
129. But see Joann Henderson, The Gaglia-Lowry Brief: A Quantum Leap From Strip
Down to Chapter 7 Cram Down, 8 BANK& Dxv. J. 131 (1991). "A Chapter 20 . . . only
prolongs the whole process, costs more money, and interferes with the debtor's fresh start.
No one gains from this two step process, and requiring a Chapter 20 elevates form over
substance." Id. at 141-42. Henderson advocates "restoration" a "Chapter 7 power to restructure secured debt" which is the "logical terminal" of the courts' efforts to allow deserving
debtor's to save their home and get a fresh start. Id. at 131.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 20-32.
131. In re Cowen, 29 B.R. 888, 895 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
132. 110 S. Ct. 2126, 2130 (1990).
133. 52 B.R. 6, 7 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
134. In re Johnson, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 2154 (1991).
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payment in that it has a right to the proceeds from the debtor's home, ' 3a
and the discharge terminated only one way of enforcing the claim, not the
claim itself.15 '
The Court dismissed the concern in Binford that the debtor is compelling the debtor to accept a reaffirmation of the debt 3' by saying since
Congress "did not expressly limit § 102(2) to, nonrecourse loans, but
rather chose general language broad enough to encompass, such obligations,"'1'3 any obligation that had the "relevant attributes" 13of a nonrecourse obligation was covered, no matter how it came about. '
The major weakness in Johnson and the cases leading up to it is their
reliance on their interpretation of how broad Congress really intended the
term claim to be read. The Court already made one mistake that is strikingly similar to the one it may be making here. 40 In Davenport the Court
found that "[T]he statutory language plainly reveals Congress' intent not
to except restitution orders from discharge in certain Chapter 13 proceedings.114' Congress, however, considered and passed legislation specifically
to overturn the result in Davenport within nine months.14 2 The Court in
Davenport also relied on Congress' failure to include restitution in the list
of specific exceptions to discharge applicable to Chapter 13.43 Similarly,
the Court now relies on the fact that Congress expressly prohibited certain serial filings but did not specifically prohibit the "Chapter 20" scenario.1 4 4 Again, Congress promptly added restitution to the list of exceptions, thereby indicating that its "intent" was not revealed so plainly as
4
the Court thought.'

5

135. Id.
136. Id. See In re Saylors, 869 F.2d 1434, 1436 ("Although . . .no longer personally
liable

...

[the debtor] still has two valuable property rights .... );In re Ligon, 97 B.R.

398, 400 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1989) (". . . when that case was closed without the trustee selling
the debtor's home, the home was abandoned to the debtor, i.e. title to the home reverted to
the debtor."); See also BAXTER DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE (1989)
§ 24A.22, particularly note 255.
137. 53 B.R. 307, 309 (Bankr. W.D. Kentucky 1985).
138. 111 S. Ct. at 2155.
139, Id.See In re Ligon, 97 B.R. at 402-03.
140. See 111 S. Ct. at 2154 n.5.
141. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126, 2133.
142. Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No 101-581, 104 Stat. 2856 (1990).
See supra text accompanying note 95.
143. 110 S.Ct. at 2133. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1979 & Supp. 1991) (amended to include that exception by Pub. L. 101-581 § 3, 104 Stat. 2856 (1990)).
144. 111 S.Ct. at 2156. For a discussion of the unreliability of this reasoning, see REED
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES, Chap. 12, sec. F. (Little,
Brown & Co. 1975).
145. Pub. L. 101-581 § 3; 104 Stat. 2865 (1990).
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Courts have cited the decision in Johnson in a variety of contexts. A
Wisconsin court cited it as support for allowing Chapter 13 plans which
end in balloon payments.' A Florida court used it as a guide for general
statutory interpretation. 147 Another court in Florida cited Johnson in refraining from imposing sanctions against a debtor in an attempted Chapter "62.'" The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that unincurred
environmental response costs under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation Liability Act are "claims" dischargeable in bankruptcy. 14 ' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held this broad reading of
the definition of "claim" includes punitive damages under section 523
(a)(615 of the Bankruptcy Code.15
An Illinois court cited the broad definition of "claim" in Johnson and
Davenport in denying a motion by the United States to dismiss a dispute
between a debtor and the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS")."52' The
debtor was involved in thirty-one corporations, many with potential liability for unpaid employment taxes. The debtor had a "pot" of some
$640,000 with which to pay his creditors, but the IRS refused to immediately pursue its potential claim. If the court had granted the motion,
debtor's unsecured creditors would have taken all the pot and left the
debtor still liable for the claims of the IRS."" The court held that the
"exactly the kind of
contingent and unliquidated claim of the IRS was
4
obligation Congress wanted to have resolved."'

The decision in Johnson should overrule In re Honacker, 55 at least in
part. In Honacker a bank that lent money to the defendant debtor on two
snowmobiles filed its proof of claim in defendant's Chapter 13 case almost
one month after the hearing date."" Debtor attempted to avoid the lien
146. In re Groff, 131 B.R. 703, 707 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1991).
147. In re Ferguson, 134 B.R. 689, 693 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991).
148. In re Barker, 129 B.R. 287, 290 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (four Chapter 13 filings).
See also Matter of Smith, 133 B.R. 467, 469-70 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991) (prior dismissal
with prejudice did not preclude second Chapter 7 filing).
149. In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d. 997, 1005 (2nd Cir. 1991). See also In re Torwico
Electronics, Inc., 131 B.R. 561, 567 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1991) (when the debtor couldn't clean up
the pollution himself without paying money, the obligation to clean up is a dischargeable
debt).
150. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1979). "[A] discharge .. does not discharge an individual debtor
form any-debt .

.

. for money, property, [etc.) . .. obtained under . .. false pretenses, a

false representation, or actual fraud."
151. In re Britton, 950 F.2d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 1991). See also In re Dahlstrom, 129 B.R.
240, 242 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991).
152. In re Kilen, 129 B.R. 538, 548 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1991).

153. Id. at 538-40.
Id. at 548.
155. In re Honacker, 4 B.R. 415 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980).
156. Id. at 416-17.
154.
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under section 1327' s5 of the code which binds all creditors and vests all
property in the debtor on confirmation free and clear of any claim of any
creditor provided for by the plan. The court held the word claim found in
section 1327 did not include lien, and therefore a lien is unaffected by
section 1327.166 The court's decision in .Honacker led the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in In re Simmons' " to conclude that a secured creditor,
who did not object to a plan listing him as unsecured, did not have his
lien lifted from debtor's homestead by section 1327.100 As Johnson makes
clear, a lien is a claim,"' weakening both Honacker and Simmons.
Finally, the decision in Johnson establishes that a, secured claim is actually two claims, one for money and one for a lien on the property. "
VIII. CONCLUSION
If Johnson stands, the courts will turn to the question of good faith,
using it to police the "jocular" ' Chapter 20.164 Remember that the Supreme Court did not address this issue in Johnson.""The Bankruptcy
Court for the Middle District of Florida, in a post Johnson decision, held
that a debtor may not "manipailate the system by pre-planning a Chapter
7 case in order to obtain a discharge and then turn around and file a
Chapter 13 case for the sole purpose of frustrating a mortgagee ...."1166
Even though parallels with Davenport and its subsequent demise are
interesting, the use by deserving debtors of the Chapter 20 device to save
1
their homes is more in line with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code '7
157. 11 U.S.C. 1327 (1979). Section 1327 reads as follows:
(a) The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor,
whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether
or not such creditor has object to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan,
the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate int he debtor.
(c) Except as otherwise provided int he plan or in the order confirming the plan,
the property vesting in the debtor under subsection (b) of this section is free and
clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan.
158. In re Honecker, 4 B.R. 415, 416-17 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980).
159. In re Simmons, 765 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1985).
160. Id. at 555-57.
161. In re Johnson, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 2154 (1991).
162. Bankr. L. Daily (BNA) June 27, 1991 (WESTLAW, BKR-TP library, BNA-BLD
database). See also In re Magras, 129 B.R. 429, 432 (Bankr. D. V.I. 1991)
163. In re Saylors, 98 B.R. 1005, 1008 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1988).
164. 111 S. Ct. at 2156.
165. Id. at 2156. See also text accompanying supra note 141.
166. In re Hornlein, 130 B.R. 600, 603 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
167. One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy laws is to give "honest but unfortunate debtors" a way to "reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy 'a
new opportunity in life with a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
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than use of the code by criniinal debtors to avoid restitution.16s Current
legislative history reveals no action in Congress to overturn Johnson.1"'
LANCE JONES

discouragement of preexisting debt.' ; Grogan v. Garner, f 11 S. Ct. 654, 659 (1991) (quoting
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 2i4 (1934)). The purpose of Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is specifically to "achieve broad, extensive, and unqualified discharge of the
debts for a working debtor." In re Rasmussen, 888 F.2d 703, 705 (10th Cir. 1989).
168. See, e.g., In re Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126, 2134-39 (1990) (Justice Blackmun dissenting in Davenport); See also the legislative history accompanying the 'Criminal Victims
Protection Act, S. REP. 434, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990), reprinted at 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N
4072.
169. The congressional record was searched using both the LEXIS/NEXIS and
WESTLAW computer data bases.

